Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to clarify Kierkegaard's account of religious faith and divine grace by comparing it to Kant's moral faith. I argue that the double movement of faith in Fear and Trembling explicates the formal structure of religious faith and provides a key to understanding what Kierkegaard means by religiousness and divine grace. I argue that later works (notably Postscript ) make use of the account found in Fear and Trembling .
1 Furthermore, I try to show why divine grace plays a crucial role in Kierkegaard's theory and why the ethical stage (represented by Judge William) is problematical. Rather than belonging to the ethical stage (as claimed by Hare), 2 Kant has a different account of religious faith and divine grace, an account which not only anticipated Kierkegaard's account of faith but also represents an alternative to it. By saying this, my interpretation of the relation between Kant and Kierkegaard differs not only from that of Hare but also from the interpretations of Green and Knappe. Although Knappe presents Kant's radical evil as analogous to Kierkegaard's original sin, he maintains that with Kierkegaard's Christian stage of existence 'nearly all affinity with Kantian thinking stops.' 3 Green, on the other hand, tries to show that when Kant introduces the doctrine of radical evil, his philosophy of religion runs into problems, problems which Kierkegaard can be seen as resolving by way of a reliance on divine grace and revelation.
4 By relying on recent scholarship on Kant's philosophy of religion, I will attempt to provide a corrective to these interpretations, claiming that the picture looks quite different if we take into account Kant's mature account of divine grace. Finally, I spell out some important consequences Kierkegaard's account of faith has for the relation between philosophy and theology, 
Kant on grace, human agency, and divine agency
The previous chapters have shown how Kant's philosophy of religion is based on the doctrines of radical evil and the highest good. Whereas the previous chapter focused on how these two doctrines lead Kant to postulate God's existence and to defend moral faith, the present chapter shows that these two doctrines lead to the assumption of divine grace. Kant proceeds from the premise that we should promote the highest good, a moral world in which the virtuous are happy.
6 Kant argues that even though moral virtue depends on the exercise of human freedom, the realization of the highest good does not depend on individual effort alone.
7 More specifically, divine assistance is needed in order for virtue to lead to happiness and in order to unite the forces of separate individuals so that they become part of an ethical commonwealth.
8 Kant argues:
Since by himself the human being cannot realize the idea of the supreme [ höchsten ] good inseparably bound up with the pure moral disposition, either with respect to the happiness which is part of that good or with respect to the union of the human beings necessary for the fulfillment of the end, and yet there is also in him the duty to promote the idea, he finds himself driven to believe in the cooperation or the management of a moral ruler of the world, through which alone this end is possible. However, our ability to do good does not depend on divine grace. Kant dismisses such a view on practical grounds, claiming that it would bypass our agency and undermine our responsibility. Nevertheless, several scholars have argued for a moderate type of grace in Kant's theory, even at the level of virtue.
10
Kant interprets moral improvement in temporal terms as an endless progression wherein we move forward without ever reaching perfection. Since the progression towards perfection is not perfection itself, our deeds are always defective.
11 For some reason, however, God counts an individual's progression toward perfection as perfection itself. The point seems to be that he who progresses receives God's grace so that he attains perfection and happiness.
